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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the excise tax will attach. If it can be said that the basis of an
inheritance tax or an income tax is the exercise of a privilege or
right, then the fact that the exercise of this privilege or right may
exist more often in the case of an income tax than in the case of
an inheritance tax should not make any difference.
The constitutional definition of property suggests that the fundamental basis of a property tax is ownership. It seems that the
real intent and purpose of the definition is to secure a uniform
rate of taxation on tangibles and intangibles and not to unreasonably extend the limitations1 ' on taxation by including within the
class of property taxes 2 those forms of taxes which are clearly
and properly excises. If it is more reasonable to classify an income
tax as an excise rather than a property tax, the problem of its unconstitutionality in violation of the uniformity clause is removed
and the tax may be sustained."2
HAROLD HESTNES.

RECENT CASES
ASSIGNMENTS-UTUPE

WAGES-UNDER CONTRACT, EMPLOYMENT OR POS-

SIBLE CONTRACT OR EMPLOYMENT. H attempted to assign to W "33%% in
all plays, novels, motion picture scenarios and stories now and hereafter
written by me and all returns of money received by me." At the time of
the purported assignment H, a writer, was not employd, but later W
proved that he had worked 28 weeks for Warner Bros. The character of
the employment was not shown. Upon suit by W against H for an
accounting under the written assignment, the court held that the assignment was invalid, since it was not based on present employment or existing contract, Orkow v. Orkow, 23 Pac. (2) 781, (Cal. 1933).
Besides upholding assignments of salaries or money due, Rodgers v.
Torrent, 111 Mich. 680, 70 N. W 335 (1899)
Carnegie Trust Co. v. Battery Place Realty Co., 67 Misc. Rep. 452, 122 N. Y. S. 697 (1910) Vollmer
v. Vollmer 46 Idaho 97, 266 Pac. 677 (1928) the courts sanction assignments of wages to be earned in the future under a contract, or employment in existence at the time without a contract binding the employer,
State St. FurnitureCo. v. Armour & Co., 259 Ill. App. 589, Judg. Aff. 345
Ill. 160, 177 N. E. 702 (1931) Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553, 102 Pac. 956
1LThe state constitutions are limitations upon and not grants of legislative powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 759;
Gentier v. Ditmoar 204 N. Y. 20, 97 N. E. 464 (1912) Everett v. Anderson,
106 Wash. 355, 180 Pac. 144 (1919). "Nothing but express constitutional
limitations upon legislative authority can exclude anything, to which the
authority extends from the grasp of the taxing power, if the legislature
in its discretion shall at any time select it for revenue purposes." Cooley
on Taxation, 4th Ed., Vol. 1. paragraph 71.
12 The constitutions of California, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin expressly provide for an income
tax.
13In an attack upon the constitutionality of any statute the burden
of proof is upon the opponents of the statute to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that it is in conflict with the constitution and therefore void.
Washington has recognized this rule and in State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77
Pac. 961 (1904), determines the rule to be: "When the constitutionality
of an act of the legislature is drawn in question, the court will not declare
it void unless its invalidity is so apparent as to leave no reasonable doubt
upon the subject." In view of the difference of opinion on the subject of
whether an income tax is a property or an excise tax it seems questionable whether the invalidity of the income tax law is so apparent as
to leave no reasonable doubt upon the subject.
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(1909) Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N. Y. 179, 128 N. E. 113 (1920)
Rodijkeit v. Andrews, 77 N. E. 747 (Ohio 1906) The Amencan Law Institute's Restatement o1 the Law of Contracts,sec. 154(1), although the early
cases held that money to be earned thereafter under a new engagement
was not assignable, requiring a present contract of employment binding
the employer, Herbert v. Bronson, 125 Mass. 475 (1878).
However, where employment does not exist, but the party may be employed by another in the future, a mere possibility not coupled with an
interest exists, and the wages are not assignable, Walker v. Rich, 79 Cal.
Globe Indemnity Co. v. West Texas Lumber
App. 139, 249 Pac. 56 (1926)
Co., 34 S. W (2) 896 (Texas 1931) Cox v. Hughes, supra.
The distinction appears to be that in the one class of cases an attempt
is made to assign something which exists in expectancy only- whereas, in
the other class of cases one has entered into a contract or upon an employment whereby, in the ordinary course of events, wages will be earned
or property acquired as the direct result of the contract, engagement or
employment.
Profitable employment is held to be a realty- and money from such a
service is not a bare expectancy or mere possibility. It constitutes a
present, existing right of property, which may be sold or assigned as any
other property, Citizens Loan Association v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 196 Mass.
528, 530, 82 N. E. 696, 697, 124 Am. St. Rep. 584, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025,
13 Ann. Cas. 365 (1907).,
A late Washington case, Horchover v. Pacific Marine Supply Co., 171
Wash. 330, 17 Pac. (2) 915 (1933), held that money to be earned during
the fishing season was potentially existent, and that a fund to be assignable need not be actually existing, it being sufficient if it is potentially
existent, thus holding valid such an assignment given for a loan with
which to carry on the fishing operations.
Some states have statutes specifically permitting assignments of wages
to be earned in the future under an existing employment. Although Washington has no such statute, R?. R. S. 7597, states that no assignment of, or
order for, wages to be earned in the future to secure a loan of less than
three hundred dollars shall be valid against an employer of the person
making said assignment or order unless said assignment or order, and the
acceptance of tha same have been filed and recorded with the county
auditor, etc. Thus by placing the limitation thereon, it impliedly holds
such assignments to be valid.
Although the courts will not uphold an assignment of wages to be
earned under a contract or employment not in existence at the time, yet
equity will construe the instrument as imposing a lien upon the res
when produced or acquired. This leaves the legal title still in the grantor
who may by some act ratify the grant as by delivery of the property,
making the legal title complete in the vendee. The explanation is sometimes given that the assignment operates as a contract by the assignor
to convey the legal estate or interest when it vests in him, and that equity
will specifically enforce such a contract by decreeing a conveyance. EdCasady v. Scott, 40 Idaho
wards v. Peterson, 14 Atl. 936 (Maine 1888)
137, 237 Pac. 415 (1924).
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
sec. 154(2), states that an assignment of a right expected to arise under
a contract or employment not then existing is operative only as a promise by the assignor to assign the right, and an authorization to the
assignee to enforce it, but neither imposes a duty upon the obligor nor
precludes garnishment by the obligee's creditors.
However, the instant California case is silent as to the enforcing of the
attempted assignment against the assignor as a contract to assign the fund
when it became due, merely holding the assignment to be invalid. While
the case follows the great weight of authority in holding it to be invalid
as an assignment, it may be noted that the court has overlooked the possibility of enforcing the instrument against the assignor as a contract to
assign when the fund became due or into the hands of the assignor.
C. P. Z.
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The
BANKS-RIGHT OF STATE BANKS TO PiOcURE DEPOSIT INSURANCE.
Banking Act of 1933 contains provisions for the insurance of bank deposits. A Temporary Insurance Fund is provided for, which will insure
the deposits of all banks, state or national, which contribute to the fund.
The bank must advance a certain percentage of its deposits to the fund,
and will thereby have its deposits insured from January 1, 1934, to July
1, 1934. After July 1, 1934, the permanent insurance will be in effect.
A bank will become entitled thereto by purchasing stock in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, but after July 1, 1936, it must also be a
member of the Federal Reserve System. The act has recognized the fact
that state banks will not be able to own stock in the Corporation, by a provision that state banks may have the insurance from July 1, 1934, to July
1, 1936, by sending the Corporation an amount equal to the price it
would have to pay for the stock. If the state laws are not amended at
the next session of the legislature so as to allow the bank to become a
full-fledged participator in the deposit insurance, this amount will be
returned to the bank and its deposits will be no longer insured.
Admitting that a state bank would have no power to own stock in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation under present laws, would it
have power to spend any funds in order to take advantage of either the
temporary insurance or of the "permanent" insurance until July 1, 19369
State banks are regulated by state law, and th disposition and Investment of their assets is regulated by statutes passed before 1933. Since
they could not give any express power to utilize funds in this manner,
the authority must be found among the implied powers of banks.
A bank cannot pledge its assets to secure deposits. State Bank of
Conurerce v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750 (1933). One reason for this
well-recognized rule is that a preference is thus created in favor of one
depositor. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will not insure
all deposits fully but only the smaller ones. Hence, the money spent by
the bank for deposit insurance would benefit the smaller depositors more
than it would the larger ones. This does not seem much different from
securing a favored few of the depositors by the pledging of assets for
their benefit. But it differs in that there is nothing secret about it.
All the depositors will know that the bank has expended its assets for
deposit insurance and can act accordingly. However, this suggests what
is perhaps the strongest argument against such an expenditure, namely,
that it is not for the equal benefit of all depositors.
That argument, however, is overborne by other considerations. A
bank has all powers necessary to carry on the business of banking, and to
enable it to carry on the business safely and prudently. First National
Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U. S. 122, 23 L. Ed. 679 (1876)
Dzvde County v. Baird, 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W 236 (1927).
The protection of depositors is an important part of the business of
banking. The procuring of deposit insurance, with a relatively small
outlay of funds, would thus seem to be within a bank's powers. Nearly
all the limitations on the powers of banks are for the protection of
the depositors, so whatever is done to protect them further is in accord
with that policy. This is illustrated by the rule that a bank may pay
premiums on a bond securing deposits. McFarson v. National Surety Co.,
72 Colo. 482, 212 Pac. 489 (1923) Interstate National Bank v. Ferguson,
Page Trust 0o. V. Rose, 192 N. C.
48 Kan. 732, 30 Pac. 237 (1892)
673, 135 S. E. 795 (1926).
This conclusion is also supported by practical considerations. Participation in this deposit insurance will be necessary to the very existence of
a state bank. The deposits in all national banks will be insured, so depositors will inevitably be drawn to them. When a state bank is thus
faced with the possibility of losing all of its depositors, it would be
strange indeed to say that procuring deposit insurance is not necessary
G. V P
to the business of banking.
Action to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAv-TAXATION-CORPORATE FRANCHISES.
perpetually enjoin the treasurer of Spokane County from collecting taxes
based on the statutes of 1928 assessed against banks, trust companies,
building and loan associations, and financial institutions. Plaintiff con-
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tended that the taxing measure was invalid in that the value of the capital
stock was based on a separate assessment of each item of personal property, the corporate franchise being considered an item of personal property. Held: The tax is invalid. The corporate franchise is property, but
it is not taxable property, capable of separate assessment, because the
corporate franchise has no transfer value. Hank of Fairfield et al. v. Spokane County, 73 Wash. Dec. 64, 22 Pac. 2d 646 (1933).
This case is the last of a series of cases to declare invalid the various
methods devised to tax financial institutions in Washington: Spokane
and Eastern Trust Company v. Spokane County, 153 Wash. 332, 280 Pac. 3
(1929) National Bank of Commerce, Seattle v. King County, 153 Wash.
351, 280 Pac. 16 (1929) Aberdeen Savings and Loan Assoctation v. Chase,
157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536 (1930). Since the case is complicated by the
factual situation involving as it does national banks, tax exempt securities, and an unsystematic mode of assessment, the result reached by the
court is correct and very fortunate.
Strictly speaking, the franchise of a corporation consists of the rights,
powers and privileges given by the act of the Legislature incorporating
it, or the certificate of incorporation creating its existence. People v.
Consolidated Gas Company, 113 N. Y. S. 393, 130 App. Div. 626 (1909).
Corporate franchises are of three kinds: the franchise to be, which is
the right to exist as a corporation; the franchise to do, which is granted
to a corporation when organized to perform certain acts or to carry on
certain businesses; and the special franchises, which are rights granted
to carry on special enterprises not granted to all corporations. Blackrock
Copper Mining and Milling Company v. Tingley, 34 Utah 369, 98 Pac. 180,
28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 255 (1908) Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations,Vol. 14, see. 6954.
The corporate franchise is subject to an excise tax. Society for Savings
v. Coite, 6 Wall 607, 73 U. S. 897 (1867) Maine v. Grand Trunk By. Company of Canada,142 U. S. 228, 12 S. Ct. 12, 35 L. Ed. 994 (1891) Flint v.
Stone Tracy Comipany, 220 U. S. 108, 55 L. Ed. 389 (1910)
Underwood
Typewrite'r Company v. Chamberlain,41 S. Ct. 45, 254 U. S. 113, 65 L. Ed.
165 (1920).
The corporate franchises to be and to do are property. Comimercial
Electric Light and Power Company v. Judson, 21 Wash. 49, 56 Pac. 829, 57
L. R. A. 78 (1899)
Edison Electric illuminating Company v. Spokane
County, 22 Wash. 168, 60 Pac. 132 (1900) Horn Silver Mining Company
tv. N. Y., 143 U. S. 305, 36 L. Ed. 164 (1891) Bank of California v. County
of San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832, 64 L. R. A. 918, 100 Am. St.
Rep. 130 (1904) whether the corporation is a domestic or a foreign corporation. Postal Telegraph Cable Company v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 39 L.
Ed. 311 (1894). Being property, the corporate franchises to be and to do
are taxable as such. State Railroad Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. Ed. 663
(1876) State ex rel Milwaukee St. Ry. Company v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550,
63 N. W 746 (1895)
either separately or in connection with the other
property of the corporation. People v. N. Y. ,Board of Tax Commissioners,
199 U. S. 48, 50 L. Ed. 79, 25 S. Ct. 713 (1905) People v. Miller 180 N. Y.
16, 72 N. E. 525 (1904)
State Board of Assessors v. Central By. Company, 48 N. J. Law 283, 4 Atl. 578 (1886) but see, Adams Express Company v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171, 41 L. Ed. 960, 17 S. Ct. 527 (1896). The corporate franchise is taxable as personal property even though the legislative body has not specified a manner of evaluation and assessment, State
ex rel Milwaukee St. By. Company v. Anderson, supra.
The franchise of a bank is taxable in the same manner as the franchise of any other corporation, Bank of California v. County of San Francisco, supra.
There is a strong minority holding that refuses to concede that
the corporate franchise is property, Conwnwealth v. Ledman, 127
Ky. 603, 106 S. W 247 (1907)
Blaekrock Copper Mining and Milling
Company v. Tingley, supra, State ex tel Kansas City v. East Fifth
St. Ry. Company, 140 Mo. 539, 41 S. W 955, 92 Am. St. 742, 38,
L. R. A. 218 (1897), the latter case distinguishing between the franchise
to be and the franchise to do and holding only the former to be not property and not subject to taxation as property.
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The Washington court admits that the franchise of a corporation is
property, but refuses to hold that it is taxable property, relying on Article
VII, sec. 2 of the Constitution of the State of Washington. This provides:
"The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate
of assessment and taxation of all property in the state, according
"
to its value in money
The court quotes the phrase in italics and concludes that a franchise,
having no transfer value, and not being subjected to the payment of corporate debts, has no money value, hence is not taxable as personal
property.
In a series of cases from 1899-1901, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the corporate franchise was taxable under the laws of this state.
In Com'mercial Electric Light and Power Company v. Judson, supra,
the court held valid a tax levied on the corporate franchise of plaintiff
company, evaluated at $5000. The decision is based on two Washington
statutes; Section 8 of the Revenue Laws of 1897 naming a franchise as
one of the types of personal property to be listed by the tax assessor and
section 5202, Ballinger's Code, providing that all franchises of every kind
and nature are subject to sale upon execution and sale upon foreclosure
of mortgage, in the same manner as other personal property Accord: Edison Electric Illuminating Company v. Spokane County, supra. If a franchise
has value so that it can be sold on execution, it would seem to have value
sufficient to satisfy the test given in National Lumber and Manufacturing
Com'pany v. Chehalis County 86 Wash. 483, 150 Pac. 1164 (1915). "The
true value of property is defined as that value at which the property
would be taken in payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor." This
test of "value" is adopted in Bank of Fairfield v. Spokane County, supra.
Legislative direction as to the manner of evaluation of franchises is a
matter of convenience and not a matter of necessity. Lack of such direction does not invalidate statute providing for the taxing of corporate
franchises, Commonwealth Electric Light and Power Company v. Judson,
supra, State ex tel Milwaukee St. Ry Company v. Anderson, supra. See
40 Harvard Law Review 1020.
A right granted to a company by statute to operate a log boom and to
charge tolls for the storage of logs on a floatable stream is a franchise
subject to taxation as an item of personal property, even though the corporation exercising the right has already paid an excise tax for the right
to do business in the state. Chehalis Boom Conpany v. Chehalis County,
24 Wash. 135, 63 Pac. 1123 (1901).
For 32 years, the problem of the ad valorem taxing of corporate franchises did not come before the Washington court. In 1933 the court considered the matter in Bank of Fairfield v. Spokane County, supra, and
impliedly overruled the three earlier cases by reaching a contrary result
without referring to them. This is especially interesting in view of the
fact that the statute relied on in Commercial Electric Light and Power
Company v. Judson, supra, remains unmodified, REM. REV. STAT. SECTION
520. However, it may be that the cases are to be distinguished. The three
earlier cases concern special franchises involving the right of eminent
domain. The latter case involves the franchise to do and the franchise to
be. This distinction, however, seems unfounded.
Regardless of these statutory provisions, supra, had the case involved
tax assessments made later than in 1928, and thus been governed by
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the State of Washington, adopted
in 1930, the decision of the court might have been different. By this
amendment, Article VII providing for taxation according to the value of
the property was expunged and the following inserted: "All taxes shall
be uniform upon the same class of property in the territorial limits of
the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected for public
purposes only The word 'property' as herein used shall mean and include
everything whether tangible or intangible, subject to ownership." (Italics
mine) Since the amendment substituted ownership for value as the basis
of determining the taxability of an item, and since the court has held
that the corporate franchise is property and thus subject to ownership, it
might be that a tax measure containing the same provisions as those declared invalid in Bank of Fairfield v. Spokane County, supra, could be
upheld today
M. A. M.

REGENT GASES
CONTRACTS-THIRD PARTY BENFMCIAIES-SURETIES ON BUILDING CONAction by persons who had furnished material and labor in the
construction of an apartment building and brought against the owner, the
contractor and the surety who had become such on behalf of the principal
contractor under a bond containing the following provisions: "Now, Thereif the principal shall
fore, the condition of this obligation is such that
pay all persons who have contracts directly with the principal for labor
or materials, failing ohicl such persons shall have a direct right of action
against the principal and surety under this obligation,
then this obligation shall be null and void
" (Italics ours). Held: The action may
be maintained against the surety. Electro-Kold Sales Corp. v. General
Casualty Co., 74 Wash. Dec. 505, 25 Pac. (2nd) 572 (1933).
The Washington court has held in a number of decisions that materialmen and laborers, not being in privity with the principal contractor's
surety, can not sue him. Forsyth v. N'ew York Indemnity Co., 159 Wash.
318, 293 Pac. 284 (1930), which case reviews the earlier decisions. A contrary rule is, of course, applied in cases involving statutory bonds on public construction contracts. Pacific Bridge Co. v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 33
Wash. 47, 73 Pac. 772 (1903).
Lack of privity can hardly be said to be the sole reason for refusing
to materialmen and laborers a direct right of action against the surety,
inasmuch as the third party beneficiary doctrine is recognized by the
Washington court in other stiuations. See Gilmore v. Skookun Box Fac
tory, 20 Wash. 703, 56 Pac. 934 (1899)
Reiley v. Spokane Sanitary
Laundry Co., 71 Wash. 516, 128 Pac. 1075 (1913) Finkelberg v. Continental Casualty Co., 126 Wash. 543, 219 Pac. 12 (1923) Hargis 'U. Hargis,160
Wash. 594, 295 Pac. 742 (1931).
The relation of materialmen and laborers to the principal contractor's
surety is somewhat anomalous. They are not true donee beneficiaries,
there being no intent to make them a gift. Payment to them discharges
an obligation owed them, by the contractor. They are not true creditor
beneficiaries since the owner, the surety's promisee, owes them nothing.
The owner is, however, interested in seeing them paid because the property
is subject to their liens. They appear to occupy a position mid-way
between the two classifications and it seems hardly justifiable to relegate
them to the position of mere incidental beneficiaries without right of
action against the surety.
Apparently, materialmen and laborers are denied recourse against the
surety in the Forsyth case and the earlier cases therein cited because the
usual form of bond is regarded as given to protect the owner and as for
his indemnity only. The court in our instant case distinguishes those
cases on that point. The force of the bond provision indicated above is
to rebut the presumption that the bond is solely for indemnity of the
owner and to indicate that materialmen and laborers are given an
interest therein, bringing the case within the rule of those cases applying the third party beneficiary rule.
Although the language employed in the bond is that materialmen and laborers shall have a right of
action, it would seem they must nevertheless enforce their claims as a
derivative right and through the surety's promise to the owner. Such a
provision would not make them parties to the contract.
The instant case thus indicates an effective mode of giving materialmen and laborers a direct right of action against the surety. This
arrangement might conceivably be of considerable value to the owner in
many situations.
See, for a comprehensive compilation of authorities on this problem,
Professor Corbin's article, "Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors'
Surety Bonds," 38 Yale L. Jour. 1. For a compilation of the Washington
decisions relating to third party beneficiaries, see the Washington Annotations prepared by Dean Shepherd for Sections 133-147 inclusive of the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, to be published in an early issue
of THE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW.
W L. S.
TRACTS.

CoiironATIoNs-REMEDIEs OF RECEIVER IN COLLECTION OF UNPAID STOCic
SuiscnIPTIoNs. A receiver of an insolvent corporation filed what purported to be a final and complete report of the receivership. Creditors
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of the corporation objected to the report, asking that the receiver be
directed to collect unpaid stock subscriptions to an amount sufficient to
meet the corporate liability of $38,000. The receiver was one of the delinquent stockholders. The trial court directed the receiver to pay to
the full amount of his unpaid subscription, $25,000, but was silent as to
the other stockholders. Both the creditors and the receiver appealed.
The decree of the trial court was reversed, the Supreme Court holding
that, among other grounds for reversal, one stockholder cannot be singled
out and alone directed to pay the full amount of his unpaid subscription.
The cause was remanded with instructions for the trial court to "direct
that proceedings be instituted to collect unpaid subscriptions of all stockholders whose stock subscriptions have not been paid, not in excess of
the amount due from any one of them and in proportion to the amount
necessary to satisfy the proven debts of the insolvent company, together
with the costs of the receivership." Einar Johnsen v. Pheasant Pickling
Co., 74 Wash. Dec. 229 (1933), 24 Pac. (2d) 628.
Early decisions in this state permitted recovery against any one of
the stockholders to the full amount of his unpaid subscription. The
court regarded the action as a legal action to recover the legal indebtedness of the stockholder to the corporation, and the receiver as suing as
the representative of the corporation. Elderkzn v. Peterson, 8 Wash. 674,
26 Pac. 89 (1894). It was said, however, that the receiver must give notice
of an assessment call before action could be brought. Rem. Rev. Stats.,
section 3820; cf. Gaunce v. Schoder 145 Wash. 604, 261 Pac. 393 (1927).
The case of Cox v. Dsckse, 48 Wash. 264, 93 Pac. 523 (1908), while recognizing the right of the receiver to sue a single stockholder, held that
joinder of all delinquent stockholders was also proper, notice of assessment having been duly given as required by the previous holding.
Later cases have developed a rule requiring all delinquent stockholders
to be joined in the action and allowing recovery only on a pro rata basis.
Grady v. Graham, 64 Wash. 436, 116 Pac. 1089, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 177
(1911), stated that the stockholders were entitled to receive notice, and
to present any defenses they might have as to the claims of the creditors
against the corporation, as well as to the claim .of the corporation
against themselves. The court recognized that the stockholders are to be
sued only for their pro rata share of the liabilities of the corporation.
The holding necessarily implies that all stockholders must be joined, as
in no other way could the court satisfactorily determine their pro rata
liability. Beddow v. Houston, 65 Wash. 585, 118 Pac. 752 (1911), expressly
held that a receiver could not maintain his action against a single stockholder, on the basis that all delinquent stockholders were entitled to
notice so that the proper amount to be assessed against each could be
determined. If all were not joined, according to Chamberlatn v. Piercy,
82 Wash. 157, 143 Pac. 977 (1914), one stockholder might have to respond to the full amount of his subscription, and thereafter contest the
validity of the claims against him and seek contribution from his fellowstockholders, resulting in a multiplicity of suits. In Rea v. Eslick, 87
Wash. 125, 151 Pac. 256 (1915), it was stated as a condition precedent
to the receiver's right to sue that all stockholders have notice, and
that an order must be entered directing suit against all the delinquent
stockholders for only the amount which will meet the corporate liability
These doctrines have been accepted as settled law by subsequent
decisions. All delinquent stockholders must be given notice and an opportunity to present any defenses they may have. The court is to determine the liability of each upon a pro rata basis, and only then is the
receiver entitled to collect the allotted amount from each. Gaunce v.
Schoder supra, Johnson v. Pickling Co., 74 Wash. Dec. 299 (1933)
see Bergman v. Evans, 92 Wash. 158, 158 Pac. 961 (1916)
Connor v.
Robinson, 137 Wash. 672, 243 Pac. 849 (1926). Gaunce vi. Schoder in
tracing the development of the rule, presents a thorough review of
previous decisions.
The replacement of the doctrine of the Elderkn case by the present
rule is apparently due primarily to the fact that the action is now regarded as purely equitable in its nature. Gordon v. Cummings, 78 Wash.
515, 139 Pac. 489 (1914)
Equity's jurisdiction has been predicated upon
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U1

avoidance of multiplicity of suits, Chamberlain -v. Piercy, 82 Wash. 157,
143 Pac. 977 (1914), and upon the "trust fund" which is involved. Gordon
Gaunce v. Schoder
v. Cummings, 78 Wash. 515, 139 Pac. 489 (1914)
supra, and cases there cited. Since it is a suit in equity, it seems desirable that all should be joined in order that the rights of all may
The Washingbe determined as fully as possible in a single suit.
ton view is in accord with the weight of authority elsewhere in requiring joinder of all stockholders in this type of action. Coyle v.
Gedney
Taunton Safe Deposit Co., 210 Mass. 156, 103 N. E. 288 (1913)
Co. v. Sanford, 105 Neb. 112, 179 N. W 385 (1920) Warth '0. Moore Blind
Stitcher etc. Co., 130 N. Y. S. 748, 146 App. Div. 28 (1911) aff. 207 N. Y.
673, 10 N. E. 1135 (1912). Contra: People's Nat. Bank v). Saville, 25 App.
D. C. 139 (1905) Scott v. Barton, 258 Mo. 427, 226 S. W 958 (1920).
The arguments made in favor of joinder of all delinquent stockholders
do not apply with equal force to the provision in the decree that each
may be sued only for his pro rata share of the corporate liability. It is
difficult to see how the court can satisfactorily determine the proper
assessment in view of the fact that through insolvency or other disability of one or more of the stockholders it may frequently be impossible
to collect the full assessment, forcing the receiver to bring successive
action to recover the amount necessary to offset the corporate liability.
It might well be argued, in view of Gaunce v. Schoder, supra, that a
receiver has no authority to make an assessment call, and that by
suit for a portion of his entire claim against the stockholder, his right
to recover the whole amount has been adjudicated and he has no right
to maintain successive actions. If all delinquents were joined and
rcovery of the full amount unpaid were permitted, this difficulty would
be avoided and the receiver could pay the corporate debts, and redistribute the excess to the stockholders in an equitable manner. This would
seem to be the only procedure by which the whole transaction can be
G. S.
satisfactorily settled in one suit.
ESTOPPEL-APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER. Defendant corporation while in
financial difficulties entered upon the following arrangement with its unsecured creditors, one of whom was the plaintiff: The corporation issuea
its series B notes to its unsecured creditors; to secure these notes, the
corporation executed deeds to real estate and chattel mortgages to a trustee to liquidate and disburse the proceeds to the creditors. The trustee
entered upon the trust and distributed dividends to the extent of thirty
per cent. The series B note having matured, the plaintiff brought an
action to recover upon the note and for the appointment of a receiver
for the defendant corporation. The complaint alleged that the defendant
was insolvent; that the defendant held a large number of unpaid stock
subscriptions; and that its trustees had unlawfully paid dividends out of
capital. In defense the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had full
knowledge of and had consented to the trust arrangement, had been
paid and accepted dividends to the extent of thirty per cent on his note,
and for that reason the plaintiff was estopped and barred from maintaining his present action. The lower court awarded recovery on the note
and appointed a receiver for the defendant On appeal this judgment was
affirmed. Snyder v. Yakima Finance Corp., 74 Wash. Dec. 455 (1933).
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that it becomes the duty of
the court to appoint a receiver for an insolvent corporation whenever
an interested party asks for such action and establishes the fact of such
Insolvency to the satisfaction of the court. Smith V. Solomon Valley
Dredging Co., 147 Wash. 69, 264 Pac. 1009 (1928) Biehen v. Aetna Investment Co., 110 Wash. 460, 188 Pac. 489 (1920) Blum v. Rowe, 98 Wash.
Daws v. Edwards, 41 Wash. 480, 84 Pac. 22
683, 168 Pac. 781 (1917)
New York National Exchange Bank v. Metropolitan Bank, 28
(1905)
Wash. 553, 68 Pac. 905 (1902). In the instant case it was contended that
the plaintiff was estopped from maintaining his action by virtue of having consented to the trust arrangement and having accepted dividends
upon his note. If one with the knowledge of the facts induces another
to believe that he ratifies a transaction and that he will offer no opposition thereto, and the other in reliance thereon alters his position, the
former is estopped from repudiating the transaction. Peterson v. Berg-
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man Cabinet Mfg. Co., 145 Wash. 664, 261 Pac. 381 (1927) Klock Produce
Co. v. Robertson, 90 Wash. 260, 155 Pac. 1044 (1916) Carruthersv. Whit21 C. J 1216, 10 R. C. L. 689.
ney, 56 Wash. 327, 105 Pac. 831 (1909)
The burden of proof is on the party alleging and relying on the estoppel
as an affirmative defense, to establish all facts necessary to constitute
it. Inland Finance Co. v. Inland Motor Co., 125 Wash. 301, p. 306, 216 Pac.
14 (1923) Blanck v. PioneerMin. Co., 93 Wash. 26, 159 Pac. 1077 (1916)
21 C. J. 1250 for collection of cases.
In the instant case, the majority of the court concluded from the evidence that the plaintiff had taken no such affirmative steps which would
have induced the defendant to do any act which would not have been
taken if his consent to the trust arrangement had been withheld. The
necessary element of an estoppel is thus lacking. Therefore, it is submitted
that since the defendant was shown to have been insolvent and in the
absence of any estoppel, plaintiff was entitled to the appointment of a
L. A. C.
receiver for the defendant corporation.
RESULTIING TRUSTS-PRESUMPTIONS-PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
-EFFECT OF RrLATIONSHIP. One Lew Kay purchases a piece of land for Law
Wa Hoo, now deceased, paying for it with funds furnished by the latter
but taking title in his own name for the use and convenience of Lew Wa
Hoo. Lew Wa Hoo was given a deed of conveyance to a blank grantee,
which he put into the hands of his business manager son-in-law one Lee
Sing, to better enable him to manage the property On Lew Wa Hoo's
death, Lee Sing wrongfully filed the deed in his own name and claimed
ownership of the estate to the exclusion of deceased's heirs. The lower
court sustained a demurrer to th complaint, dismissing an action on
part of the heirs to establish a trust. On appeal the Supreme Court
held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to establish
a resulting trust. Lew You Ying v. Lew B. Key, 74 Wash. Dec. 98, 24
Pac. (2) 596 (1933).
Resulting trusts arise, not by reason of any contract between the parties, but by operation of law. In re Weir's Estate, 134 Wash. 560, 236 Pac.
Kinsch v. Kinsch. (Ill.), 181 N. E. 315 (1932). The burden of
285 (1925)
establishing the facts necessary to raise a resulting trust, however, is
upon the one furnishing the money, and such a trust can only be proven
by evidence which is clear, cogent and convincing. Spencer v. Terrel,
Herriford v. Herriford, 78 Wash. 429,
17 Wash. 514, 50 Pac. 468 (1897)
Schmitz v. Schinitz, 254 N. Y. S. 109 (1932)
139 Pac. 212 (1914)
At early common law courts held that the consideration paid by one
person to another for a conveyance to a stranger, raised a resulting trust
in favor of the one furnishing the money Riddle v. Emerson, 1 Vern 108
(1682) Anon. 2 Vent 361 (1683). The theory of a resulting trust is based
upon the presumed intention on the part of the one furnishing the money
to receive some beneficial interest. Dwjer v. Dwyer (Mass.) 176 N. E. 619
(1931) and upon the improbability of a gift to a stranger. Howe v. Howe
(Mass.), 85 N. E. 945 (1908).
Except in the states of Kentucky Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and
Wisconsin, where resulting trusts have been abolished by statute, and
in Indiana and Kansas, where they have been limited, Perry on Trusts
and Trustees, 7th edition, Chap. V sec. 142; they are still presumed where
the purchase price is paid by one party and title taken in another. Reese
Williams v. Comrnercial
v. Murnan, 5 Wash. 373, 31 Pac. 1027 (1892)
Trust Co. (Mass), 177 N. E. 538 (1931)
For a while it was thought that a resulting trust would arise only if
the whole of the purchase money were paid. Crop v. Nrorton, 9 Mod. 233
(1740) Wray v. Steele (N. Y.), V & B. 338 (1814). Other jurisdictions have
followed the aliquot part theory requiring payment of a particular part
of the whole as distinguished from a general contribution, Skehill v.
or that the money be paid for a parAbbott (Mass.), 68 N. E. 37 (1908)
ticular part of the land. In re 7ood (D. C. Ohio) 5 Fed. 443 (1881).
However, most jurisdictions now hold that if the person furnishing the
money advanced all of it, all of the estate will be held in trust for him,
and if he advances only a portion of the purchase price, the trust will be
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declared in proportion. Bowen v. Hughes, 5 Wash. 442, 32 Pac. 98 (1892)
Anderson v. Broadwell (Cal.), 6 Pac. (2) 267 (1932). But, no advancement of money to the vendee by way of a loan will give rise to a resultmg trust. Addison v. Ball (Tex.), 262 S. W 877 (1924) De Bardeleben
Coal Corp. v. Parker (Miss), 144 So. 474 (1932), nor will any subsequent
appropriation or advancement of money to the purchaser, after the purchase has been completed. Bowen v. Hughes, 5 Wash. 442, 32 Pac. 98
(1892) Peel v. Peel (Pa.), 154 Atl. 813 (1931).
If the purchaser takes the conveyance in the name of some member
of the family or other person, for whom he is under some natural, moral,
or legal obligation to provide, the presumption of a resulting trust is
rebutted, and the contrary rebuttable presumption arises, that the purchase and conveyance were intended to be a gift or advancement.
Brucker v. Dehart, 106 Wash. 383, 108 Pac. 397 (1919) Kartun v. Kartun
(Ill.), 180 N. E. 423 (1932). On the other hand, if there is a relationship,
but no duty to support, the majority of the jurisdictions hold that a resulting trust will be created. Crawford v. Hurst (Ill.), 138 N. E. 621
(1923) Gilbert v. Gilbert (Ark.), 22 S. W (2) 32 (1930). But some jurisdictions, including this one, often indulge in the presumption that a gift
was intended. Plath v. Mullins, 97 Wash. 403, 151 Pac. 811 (1915) Herriford v. Herriford, 78 Wash. 429, 139 Pac. 212 (1914) Doneen v. Doneen,
134 Wash. 271, 235 Pac. 797 (1925) Huvymel v. Marshall (W Va.), 120
S. E. 164 (1923).
The instant case is clearly correct in holding a resulting trust under
P. L.
the facts and represents the general holding.
SCHOOL DISTRICTS-LABAILrIY FOR NEGLIGENCE. In an action for personal injuries sustained by minor pupil on account of defendant's failure
to maintain proper safety-guard on electric planer in its manual training
department, Held: The court will follow prior interpretation of Rem.
Rev. Stat., Sec. 4706, denying right of action against a school district for
negligence, only where the injury occurs on athletic apparatus or appliance, or manual training equipment, used in connection with park, playground, or field house. Bowman v. Kitsap County School Distrsct No. 1,
Kitsap County, 73 Wash. Dec. 201, 22 Pac. (2d) 991 (1933).
School districts are public corporations, organized solely for the purpose of carrying out the scheme of the state to educate its citizens. Redfield v. School District No. 3 of Kittitas County, 48 Wash. 85, 92 Pac. 770
(1907). Though classed for some purposes as municipal corporations, they
are essentially only quasi-municipal corporations. Board of Dzrectors v.
Peterson, 4 Wash. 147, 29 Pac. 995 (1892) Howard v. Tacoma School Dtstrwet No. 10, Pierce County, 88 Wash. 167, 152 Pac. 1004 (1915). The district is a mere arm of the state for the administration of its school
system. Practically all its functions are, therefore, governmental. Harold
v. Tacoma School District No. 10, Pierce County, 88 Wash. 167, 152 Pac.
Attorney General ex rel Kies v. Lowry, 131 Mich. 639, 92
1004 (1915)
N. W. 289 (1902) Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332 (1877).
In the absence of statute public corporations-towns, cities, counties,
and school districts-are not liable for an injury to the rights of a plaintiff caused by the negligent acts or omissions of their officers or agents,
committed in the performance of governmental functions. Russell v. The
Hill v.
Men Dwelling in the County of Devon, 2 Term. R. 667 (1788)
Perkins v. Trask, Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332 (1877)
23 Pac. (2d) 982 (1933).
Mont. Courts have recognized that the application of this rule creates considerable hardship in individual cases, and have frequently suggested that
recourse should be had to the legislature for the purpose of creating a
liability. Russqll v. The Men Dwelling sn the County of Devon, 2 Term
23 Pac. (2d) 982 (1933).
R. 667 (1788) Perkins v. Trash, - Mont. In accordance with this suggestion several states passed laws giving a
right of action under such circumstances, and recovery was allowed under
the statute. Lyman v. County of Hampshire, 140 Mass. 311, 3 N. E. 211
Sheridan v.
McCalla v. Multnomah County, 3 Ore. 424 (1869)
(1885)
City of Salem, 14 Ore. 328, 12 Pac. 925 (1886).
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Our own legislature in 1869 enacted a statute like that of Oregon providing:
"An action at law may be maintained by any county, incorporated
town, school district or other public corporation of like character in this
state in its corporate name, and upon a cause of action accruing to it in
its corporate character, and not otherwise, in either of the following
cases:
1. Upon a contract made with such public corporation;
2. Upon a liability prescribed by law in favor of such public corporation,
3. To recover a penalty for forfeiture given to such public corporation;
4. To recover damages for an injury to the corporate rights or property of such public corporation,
An action may be maintained against a county or other of the public
corporations mentioned or described in the preceding section either upon
a contract made by such county or other public corporation in its corporate character, and within the scope of its authority, or for an injury
to the rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or omission of such
county or other public corporation."' Ren and Bal. Code, Sec. 950 and
See. 951.
At first our Territorial Supreme Court, overlooking this statute and
following the rule of the common law, held a county not liable for personal
injuries caused by a defective sidewalk under its control. Clark v. Lincoln County, 1 Wash. 518, 20 Pac. 576 (1889). Later in recognition of the
statute -a county was held liable under its terms for injuries resulting
from a defective county bridge. The phrase "for an injury to the rights
of the plaintiff' was there interpreted as meaning injuries sustained on
account of the acts or omissions of the corporation acting in its governmental capacity Kirtley v. Spokane County, 20 Wash. 111, 54 Pac. 936
(1898). Still later the same construction was given the statute as applied
to schools districts. Redfield v. School District No. 3 of Kittitas County,
48 Wash. 85, 92 Pac. 770 (1907).
The decision in the Redfield case, supra, was expressly affirmed in
Howard v. Tacoma School District NO. 10, Pierce County, 88 Wash. 167,
152 Pac. 1004 (1915). However, it was there recognized that the common
law rule of non-liability had been and still was being followed where incorporated towns and cities were involved, despite the statute, it having
been applied only to counties and school districts.
In the following cases a municipality has been accorded the sovereign
immunity of the state, no reference being made to the statute: Lawson v.
City of Seattle, 6 Wash. 184, 33 Pac. 347 (1893) Lynch v. City of North
Yakima, 37 Wash. 657, 80 Pac. (1905)
Cunningham v. City of Seattle,
42 Wash. 134, 84 Pac. 641 (1906). In the Cunningham case, supra,
it was intimated that we have no statute on the subject. Of course,
a distinction has been drawn between governmental and non-governmental functions of municipalities, reserving immunity only in the
former cases. The distinction, however, is made on a common law
basis without reference to statute, and in some cases is rather ephemeral.
Sutton v. Snohomish, 11 Wash. 24, 39 Pac. 273 (1895) Hewitt v. Seattle,
62 Wash. 377, 113 Pac. 1084 (1911) B~ork v. Tacoma, 76 Wash. 225, 135
Pac. 1005 (1913). In the Howard case, s-upra, the court, while recognizing the inconsistency in the application of the statute, was adverse to
overruling either line of decisions, holding that both must be sustained
as applied respectively to the two classes of corporations.
The liability of school districts for the negligent acts and omissions
of its officers and agents acting in their governmental capacity under
Rem. and Bal., Sec. 950 and See. 951, was reaffirmed in. Britenn v. North
Yaktma School District No. 7, 101 Wash. 374, 172 Pac. 569 (1918) Kelley
v. School District No.71 of King County 102 Wash. 343, 173 Pac. 333
(1918)
Holt v. School DistrictNo. 71 of King County, 102 Wash. 442, 173
Pac. 335 (1918).
The Washington Legislature in 1917 then enacted the following:
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"No action shall be brought or maintained against any school district
or its officers for any noncontractual acts or omissions of such district,
its agents, officers or employees, relating to any park, playground, or
field house, athletic apparatus or appliance, or manual training equipment whether situated in or about any school house or elsewhere, owned,
operated or maintained by such school district." Rem. Rev. Stat., Sec.
4706, Laws of 1917, p. 332, Sec. 1.
The Supreme Court denied an appeal from an adverse judgment filed
after the law took effect, in Foley v. Pierce Counhj School District No.
10, 102 Wash. 50, 172 Pac. 819 (1918). The action there was brought for
the death of a minor drowned in a school swimming pool. In a subsequent suit on a playground accident, the Supreme Court held the law
applied as a bar to pending actions that had accrued prior to the enactment of the statute. Bailey v. School District No. 49, 108 Wash. 612, 185
Pac. 810 (1919). In Swanson. v. School Dtstrzct No. 15, Pierce County, 109
Wash. 652, 187 Pac. 386 (1920), the court held that the statute barred an
action against a school district for injuries sustained on a circular saw
operated in a manual training department. It is to be noted that the facts
of this case are strikingly analagous to those in the principal case.
Thus far there had been no judicial construction of the statute itself,
the court having apparently assumed the language to be so direct as to
require no interpretation. But in November, 1917, action was brought for
an injury sustained by a pupil on a steel tank which had been permitted
to remain on the playground. The school district was clearly negligent.
The court held that recovery in this instance was not barred by the
statute. Stovall v. Toppentslh School Distrct No. 49, 110 Wash. 97, 188
Pa. 12, 9 A. L. R. 908 (1920). The decision was based on two grounds:
1. That the six words, "park, playground, field house, athletic apparatus,
appliance, manual training equipment," are not intended to be independent of one another- the first three are adjectives, modifying and limiting the second three. Each of the three words in the first group bears
the same relation to all the words in the second group that one of the
words in the first bears to one in the second. Thus: The word playground
is used to describe the place where the district would not be liable if the
accident occurred on athletic apparatus. 2. That the history of the passage
of the act shows that the legislature did not intend to exonerate a school
district from permitting or maintaining a nuisance upon the playground.
In reaching the construction that the first three words are adjectives
limiting the second three, the court laid some stress on the absence of
conjunctive or disjunctive words between the two groups. The ordinary
rule of English composition, however, is that the comma is generally used
to separate words of a coordinate series when these are not connected
by the coordinate conjunctions "and," "or" or "nor." An adjective,
moreover, is not separated from its noun by a comma unless the modifiers
be in series, in which case the first words of the series are separated from
each other, but certainly not the last adjective from the noun. Thus "field
house, athletic apparatus" as adjective and noun are grammatical impossibilities., It would appear that the natural and proper construction
here is that the word "or" was intended, but replaced by the comma in
the interest of rhetoric.
The result of the court's interpretation is that a school district is
exonerated from liability under this statute only where the accident
occurs on athletic apparatus or appliances or manual training equipment
used in connection with park, playground or field house. To such a
construction there are some rather obvious objections-not in the Stovall
case, for there, while a playground accident is involved, the injury was
caused by a steel tank which is, of course, neither athletic apparatus nor
appliance nor manual training equipment. But investigation will certainly fail to disclose any instance where a school district operates manual
training equipment in connection with or located in a park, playground,
or field house-unless conceivably in the last for want of housing space.
We must conclude, then, that where manual training equipment is involved, the instances in which a school district is not liable for injuries
sustained through its negligence, will be few indeed. Apparently, inclusion of "manual training equipment" in the statute is utterly futile.
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However this may be, in the two pertinent cases which have been
decided subsequently the plaintiff has been allowed a cause of action
against the school district. In Moris v. Union High School Distrwt
"A," 160 Wash. 121, 294 Pac. 998 (1931) (see 6 Wash. Law Rev. 138), suit
was brought for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in a football
game; it was alleged that he was induced to participate by his coach,
though the latter knew plaintiff was still suffering from a previous injury This was a playground accident, but the court decided the case
without mentioning Rem. Sec. 4706, basing its conclusion squarely on
Rem. and Bal. Sec. 950 and Sec 951. There was one dissent on the ground
that the effect of Rem. Sec. 4706 had not yet been determined.
The second and principal case, however, the facts of which are identical in substance with the Swanson case discussed supra, reaches a contrary result based on the same statute referred to there as controlling,
the court here allowing a right of action to the plaintiff by following the
interpretation of Rem. Sec. 4706 made in the Stovall case, supra.
If school districts, then, are to escape liability in these cases, it would
seem they must appeal to the legislature, that that body may make clear
by enactment exactly what limitations on liability of the district it
wishes to impose.
M. W

